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Dieselgate — Antitrust Edition

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You will recall that two years ago Volkswagen got in $14.7 billion worth of class action trouble for rigging software in its diesel cars to fake compliance with U.S. emission standards. The

We now learn that Volkswagen didn’t act alone.

Something rotten in Stuttgart

The German weekly news magazine Der Spiegel revealed over the weekend that, starting in 2006, Volkswagen teamed up with its Teutonic rivals BMW and Mercedes-Benz (Daimler) to avoid competing for customers.

Der Spiegel points particularly to the car makers’ savings of 80 Euros ($93) a vehicle from an agreement to limit the size of tanks holding the juice (mostly urea) allowing the emissions system to neutralize the nasty nitrogen oxide (NOx) that diesel engines emit. As a result, the cars had too little urea to knock out all the NOx. And that in turn made the software cheat necessary in order to obscure the vehicles’ failure to meet NOx emissions standards.

As Forbes wryly points out, when “you make 10 million cars a year, those 80 Euros quickly turn into real money.”

Ratting out the competish

Der Spiegel reports (with thanks to Google translator) that the cartel started decades ago:

The agreements of German car manufacturers are likely to form one of the largest cartel cases in German industrial history. They began in the 1990s and were extended to more and more subjects, probably because offenses against competition law in the [early] days were regarded as rather harmless rule violations, comparable to wrong parking.

The cartel came to light when Volkswagen turned itself in a few weeks ago. The company, which also owns Audi and Porsche, had turned over documents to Germany’s Federal Cartel Office in connection with an investigation of the steel industry. Der Spiegel notes:

Volkswagen itself then searched through all the documents that could be in this context and made them available to the cartel guards in Brussels and Bonn. This was by no means due to insight or remorse. The company wanted to take advantage of its last chance to get as far out of the matter as possible – by betraying everything and whistling the old partners.

(I guess “cartel guards” refers to antitrust enforcers and “whistling the old partners” means blowing the whistle on them.)

But the Mercedes-Benz folks also clamored to confess. Noting that which one begged for mercy first will determine which of them gets more lenient treatment, Der Spiegel concludes that in “this case, Daimler and Volkswagen are now competing with each other.”

Bwa-ha-ha.

What happens next

In the coming days, we will likely see a deluge of cases against Audi, BMW, Mercedes-Benz, Porsche, and Volkswagen.

They will at first mainly consist of putative class actions by individual owners of diesel cars and light trucks. Those cases will principally seek damages under state antitrust, consumer protection, contract, and unjust enrichment laws, but they may also request injunctive relief under federal antitrust law. Indirect purchasers like them do not have standing to,sue for damages under the federal Sherman Act.

Actions by dealers and other direct purchasers of Audi, BMW, Mercedes-Benz, Porsche, and Volkswagen vehicles will proceed under section 1 of the Sherman Act. These cases typically have the most value but take longer to develop and organize. Dealers have ongoing relationships with the manufacturers and tend to take a more circumspect approach to joining in litigation.

A big question will concern in which venue the dozens of cases from around the country will end up. That decision will fall to the Judicial Panel on Mulidistrict Litigation. Within several months, it will rule on which U.S. district court and which district judge to send the actions for pretrial proceedings.

The Panel chose Judge Charles Breyer in San Francisco for the fraud cases against Volkswagen. It may select him as well for the antitrust cases.

But the antitrust claims will have a broader scope. They won’t involve only the cheating on emissions. Per Der Spiegel, it will deal with a long-standing cartel that met hundreds of times and engaged in a variety of anticompetitive conduct.

The difference in focus and scope may prompt the Panel to transfer the cases to another district.

Candidates will likely include the Northern District of Georgia, U.S. headquarters of Mercedes-Benz and Porsche; the District of New Jersey, the U.S. Home of BMW; and the Eastern District of Virginia, where Volkswagen and Audi hang their American corporate hats.


Pharma Buyers Too Few for Class

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U.S. District Judge Mitchell S. Goldberg ruled on August 28, 2017 that a class of 24 to 25 direct purchasers did not satisfy the “numerosity” requirement of Rule 23(a)(1) for class certification. Florence Drug Co. of Florence, Inc. v. Cephalon, Inc., No. 06-c-1797, ECF 1072 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 2017), on remand from In re Modafanil Antitrust Litig., 837 F.3d 238 (3d Cir. 2016).

As yours truly noted about the Third Circuit’s remand of the case in “No Class?“:

If the decision [on class certification] goes the defendants’ way, it will transform litigation of price-fixing claims against pharmaceutical makers. No longer will wholesalers have the ability to benefit from class settlements as passive class members. (AmerisourceBergen, for example, reported that it received more than $250 million from “antitrust settlements” since 2014.) The wholesalers must either forego recoupment of billions of dollars in overcharges or bring claims against their suppliers.

That stark choice now faces direct purchasers.

Multiples for Pharma Buyers Pursuing Opt-Out Antitrust Claims

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Existential threshold

The number of companies that can bring treble-damages claims against drug manufacturers for violating federal antitrust law has dwindled. The scarcity has grown so acute that last week it crossed an existential threshold.

For the first time ever, a federal judge in Philadelphia ruled that a class of direct pharmaceuticals purchasers did not meet the “numerosity” requirement of Rule 23(a)(1) for class-action treatment. SeePharma Buyers Too Few for Class“.

The ruling may portend an end to similar class actions. With billions in treble damages at stake, the two dozen or so direct purchasers that once passively relied on class actions to recoup overcharges may have to rouse themselves.

Their ability to do so successfully will depend largely on the feasibility of pursuing the same claims on a non-class basis. What does the available evidence suggest?

Opt-Out Multiples Over Class Recoveries in Direct Purchaser Cases as Proxy

“It does not appear that anyone has undertaken and published a comprehensive empirical study that analyzes and quantifies the financial success of opt-out plaintiffs.” Charles H. Samel & Cori Gordon Moore, “Whether to Opt Out of Antitrust Class Actions: A Four-Step Checklist,” Corporate Counsel, May 26, 2015. Some examples are nonetheless available

Vitamins (2.28X). A price-fixing case by direct purchasers against a cartel of vitamins manufacturers yielded a class settlement totaling $1.17B. After the district court preliminarily approved the global pact, class members representing 75 percent of vitamins purchases opted out of the class.

They did well. “The opt-outs reaped more than $2 billion in settlements, driving down the size of the class settlement to about $300 million.” Krysten Crawford, “No More Mr. Nice Guy,” Corporate Counsel, June 1, 2004. The opt-outs thus took home roughly 2.28 times what they would have if they had stayed in the class and accepted their pro rata share of the initial class settlement ($2 billion ÷ [$1.17 billion x .75] = 2.28).

Methionine and Lysine (3X). A pair of price-fixing cases against Archer Daniels Midland accused it of fixing prices on two animal feed additives, methionine and lysine. The conspiracies generated criminal charges, guilty pleas, and a movie, The Informant!  Quaker Oats opted out “and recouped three times the amount it would have pocketed as a class member”. Id.

TFT-LCD Panels (3.5X). The direct purchaser price-fixing class action against makers of thin filter transistor and liquid crystal display monitors settled for a total of $437 million. “TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Products Direct Purchaser Antitrust Settlement”. Of the more than 75 opt-outs, three of them (Tech Data, All American Semiconductor, and Best Buy) settled for more than $529 million. “Opt-Out Plaintiffs Recover over $300 Million in LCD Antitrust Litigation,” Press Release, June 5, 2017. My firm’s opt-out clients also achieved resolutions providing substantial multiples.

Linerboard (largeX). The class claims against 12 linerboard makers settled for an aggregate of $202,572,489, an average of $2,500 for the 80,000 class members. Brandon J.B. Boulware & Jeremy M. Shur, “Opting Out of an Antitrust Class Action: Should Your Company Do It and, If So, When?,” The Antitrust Counselor, Dec. 2011. A group of 13 opt-outs reported settling with just one defendant, Weyerhaeuser, for $25 million, nearly $2 million apiece. Id.

So?

These anecdotes suggest that opt outs can do materially better by opting out than they could if they remain a passive class member in an antitrust class action. They also indicate that even if class actions become infeasible because of dwindling numbers among direct purchasers, individual cases may fill the gap, averting loss of opportunities to recover billions into in compensation for overcharges.

LIBOR Over-the-Counter Plaintiffs Win Class Certification of Price-Fixing Claims Against Banks

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Today, United States District Judge Naomi Reice Buchwald in Manhattan issued LIBOR VII, in which the court granted class certification under Rule 23(b)(3) to a class of plaintiffs who bought over-the-counter instruments that paid interest in terms of the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) and who allege that LIBOR-setting banks conspired to suppress LIBOR during the 2007-09 financial crisis.

The court declined to certify the OTC plaintiffs’ state-law claims or any claims by two other plaintiff groups. See LIBOR VII.

Plaintiffs started filing actions alleging LIBOR suppression in 2011. The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation centralized the federal cases in the Southern District of New York before Judge Buchwald later that year.

The litigation has produced seven major rulings by the district court, two by the Second Circuit, and one by the Supreme Court. The later Second Circuit opinions came out last week. See Charles Schwab Corp. v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 16-1189-cv (2d Cir. Feb. 23, 2018).

OTC plaintiffs have so far asked Judge Buchwald to approve class settlements totaling $490 million with Barclays, Citibank, and Deutsche Bank.

The court appointed Susman Godfrey LLP and Hausfeld LLP to serve as lead counsel for the class.

Antitrust Lessons for Patent Cases

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A golden age of civil antitrust, from the 1960s into the 1980s, enriched the victims of cartels and monopolies but upset corporate America.  The high cost of paying treble damages claims eventually provoked a spare-no-expense approach to defense. That in turn influenced the way plaintiffs prosecuted their Sherman Act claims.

Much the same thing has now happened with patent infringement cases, which had their own golden age in the last decade. What, if anything, can patent litigants learn from the antitrust experience? I think they can divine quite a lot. In this post, I will tell you why.

Bigger cases on average

The “millions for defense, but not one cent for tribute” attitude that developed in the antitrust defense bar and their gigantic clients aims to deter the bringing of cases in the first place. It also taxes the resources of the plaintiff, who may thus find out too late that she cannot afford to take a case through trial. Scorching the earth additionally makes a loss on the merits all the more painful for the plaintiff (or her counsel), who will have now lost a great deal of money as well.

Making the prosecution of civil antitrust cases more costly had a predictable demonstration effect over time. It principally resulted in an increase, on average, in the stakes at issue. A higher damages figure made the average Sherman Act case attractive enough to lawyers willing to work on a contingent-fee basis. It also rendered the case a better candidate for a worthwhile settlement, one that more than covered fees and expenses.

A similar dynamic exists in patent litigation. For companies that face a lot of infringement actions, the standard defense budget tops $1 million. The plaintiff needs a case worth more than $10 million in such circumstances to obtain the services of a capable contingent-fee lawyer, who will insist on a chance to earn at least three times his investment.

Aggregation

One way to make antitrust cases large enough to justify their risk and cost involves aggregation. Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits one kind of aggregation — the class action. Rule 23 and its state-law counterparts allow even a single class representative to bring claims on behalf of hundreds, thousands, or millions of claimants who have similar claims. Class treatment could convert a small, hopelessly uneconomic one-off lawsuit into a juggernaut involving many hundreds of millions of dollars and possibly even billions.

The stakes-raising feature of the class action device has turned the class certification process into an extremely expensive battlefield. In a case that I have handled for more than a decade, for example, the parties submitted more than 30 different expert reports and presented live testimony and dozens of exhibits at a five-day evidentiary hearing.

Class members with larger claims may also choose to opt out of a class action. They generally engage lawyers who specialize in handling those sorts of cases, typically on a contingent-fee basis. The lawyers in those instances may serve as aggregators, enhancing their clients’ collective bargaining leverage while reducing average costs by spreading them over more claimants and higher aggregate damages.

Patent cases do not qualify as readily for class treatment. Nor can different patent holders band together to bring infringement claims as a group. The venue and joinder rules under the America Invents Act of 2012 made multiple-party patent cases much harder to bring.

But patent holders aggregate anyway. They do it by acquiring a critical mass of patents in particular fields and even entire portfolios. In May 2023, for instance, BlackBerry sold its 32,000 patents and patent applications, apparently for close to $1 billion.

The aggregation of patents in a single holder makes for a more formidable adversary. That has led the targets of their infringement lawsuits to call them names. A favorite rhymes with goal.

Specialization

The higher cost and greater complexity that came to characterize antitrust cases as defendants counterattacked them led to another device for managing risk on the plaintiff side. Taking a Sherman Act case across the juridical goal line now demanded a high degree of skill, mastery of the subject matter, and staying power. Few plaintiff’s firms could meet those criteria.

In 1980, Steve Susman founded the first litigation boutique, Susman Godfrey (my firm), which served as lead counsel in the largest price-fixing class action then working its way through the courts, Corrugated Container. The case produced a jury verdict for the plaintiff class and more than $360 million in settlements. Other boutiques have followed suit.

Boutiques that specialize in patent cases have likewise sprung up as infringement actions have proliferated. A significant part of my firm’s cases involve infringement claims. These firms’ trial-savviness, knowledge of the peculiarities of patent law and litigation, and financial resources are all but essential for high-stakes infringement actions.

Counterclaim avoidance

A factor that deterred antitrust cases — the possibility of having to defend against a counterclaim — also may limit the appeal of patent infringement cases. Antitrust claimants often avoided the counterclaim problem by taking a low profile in class action cases but then demanding a settlement at an opportune moment, usually after the class reached a resolution of the class claims. Assignment of claims to a trustee may also work.

Patent holders generally have two choices for dealing with the possibility of a counterclaim. Either they can build or buy a patent portfolio that enables them to overawe the defendant in a dueling-patent contest (Apple and Samsung provide an example), or they can limit their business to ownership, licensing, and litigation of patent rights and thus avoid countercharges of infringing conduct.

The second model tends to make repeat infringement defendants say undiplomatic things about patent holders that do not “practice” the inventions by doing or making things or providing services with them. But the non-practicing entities are simply doing what any sensible plaintiff would do if she could — avoiding a costly and complicating counterclaim.

Past as prologue

That an older type of high-stakes commercial cases can provide lessons for a newer kind should not surprise us. The basics of the civil justice system have not changed that much.

What do you think about the way patent infringement cases have followed a pattern similar to what happened with antitrust cases? Do you think the responses of defendants have gone over the top? Have they struck an appropriate balance? Or should they go even further?

Let your fellow readers know what you think.

Commercial Roundup – June 14, 2023

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We round up the most significant appellate decisions relevant to commercial litigation each week.

Paying More in the “But-For World” as Injury to “Property”

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Last month, the American Antitrust Institute and three economists moved to file amicus briefs in favor of an economic model that quantifies what Google describes as “happiness”. AAI and the economists seek to support opinion evidence in antitrust litigation against Google, In re Google Play Store Antitrust Litig., No. 3:21-md-02981-JD (N.D. Cal.), pending before U.S. District Judge James Donato. You can read the amicus briefs here and here and Google’s opposition here.

Do people have a “property” interest in “happiness”? Does the Clayton Act require them to?

The opinion evidence comes from a professor, Marc Rysman, who heads the Department of Economics at Boston University. Dr. Rysman created an economic model that the plaintiffs hope to use to quantify the losses they claim consumers sustained due to anticompetitive conduct by Google. The plaintiffs allege that Google misused its monopoly power in the market for apps using the Android operating system for smart phones and tablets. Google moved to exclude the Dr. Rysman’s opinions, and the amici join the plaintiffs in opposing Google’s motion.

The debate, according to Google, boils down to whether Dr. Rysman’s model measures injury to “property” under Section 4 of the Clayton Act or to mere “happiness”. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a). The plaintiffs say the model provides a reasonable estimate of the lower prices consumers would have paid for the apps in a “but-for world” that would have existed if Google had not thwarted development of better apps. Damages, plaintiffs assert, equal the difference between the apps’ lower prices in the but-for world (without Google’s anticompetitive conduct) and the higher actual prices consumers paid (in the less competitive actual world). Google contends that Dr. Rysman attempts to value consumers’ loss of “happiness” rather than of “property” and depends on “abstractions” that lack grounding in real-world observations.

Google’s position strikes me as cute if not twee. Everyone agrees that antitrust laws aim to prevent losses to innovation (e.g., more variety in goods and services) and to quality (greater durability, better functionality, more pleasing appearance, and the like) through injunctive relief. Google claims that antitrust laws don’t provide a damages remedy after the losses have come to pass because consumers who would have paid less in the but-for world (without anticompetitive conduct) lack a “property” interest in what amounts to keeping more of their money.

The idea of quantifying losses to innovation and quality has an unfamiliar feel. Damages experts usually focus on measuring the price effects of price-fixing. But economics and econometrics should enable damages experts to use their long-standing principles and tools to produce reasonable estimates of the dollar value of greater variety and higher quality.

While existing antitrust doctrine has treated demonstration of price effects as almost essential to liability and damages, Dr. Rysman’s model offers a way to quantify those effects in the but-for world, where anticompetitive conduct does not exist. If successful, that kind of innovation will have price effects of its own–on the value of antitrust claims. No wonder Google opposes it.

Commercial Roundup – June 28, 2023

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We round up the most significant appellate decisions relevant to commercial litigation each week.

Welcome to The Contingency‘s Commercial Roundup for June 28!

Since our last issue, much has happened, not least FeedSpot’s recognition of The Contingency as one of the 30 Best Antitrust Law Blogs and Websites.

The courts have also stayed busy as spring turned to summer. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in two cases of interest to commercial trial lawyers and their clients. One of them breathes new life into a “consent” basis for personal jurisdiction (see Due process allows), and other resolves whether the federal Arbitration Act requires district courts that grant motions to compel arbitration to stay their proceedings (yes) (see Court must stay).

The Federal Circuit issued opinions in patent cases on obviousness (Use of two compounds) and co-inventors (Expandable hose patent). The Court also tossed the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board’s decision in a dispute over registration of a trademark that a trademark holder claimed would confuse consumers (TTAB mis-weighed), while the First Circuit upheld denial of attorney’s fees under the Copyright Act (Fight over who authored).

Meanwhile, the Third Circuit addressed a question of “falsity” under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Claim that life insurer knew) and a question of “wrong-forum tolling” of limitations as an alternative to tolling that applies in the class-action context (American Pipe tolling).

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in an appeal about discovery sanctions provides guidance on using “memory aids” and instructing witnesses not to answer question in depositions (WItness’s overuse).

The New York Court of Appeals upheld a “negligent supervision” claim against an investment bank (Investor stated), and the Supreme Court of Texas handed down several opinions on an array of subjects–limitations (Limitations defense may work), spoliation (Loss of video), sovereign immunity for claims arising from Winter Storm Uri (ERCOT dodges), non-liability of a plant owner’s owners under a “negligent undertaking” theory (Explosion of plant), and redemption of a law firm shareholder’s shares (Law firm founders).

Have a terrific Fourth of July weekend and holiday.


Commercial Roundup – July 13, 2023

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We round up the most significant appellate decisions relevant to commercial litigation each week.

Welcome to The Commercial Roundup for July 13, 2023. While the pace of new opinions has slowed, it has not stopped. And this issue includes the end of the Supreme Court’s 2022-23 Term.

Commercial Roundup – July 26, 2023

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We round up the most significant appellate decisions relevant to commercial litigation each week.

Welcome to the Commercial Roundup for July 26, 2023. With the U.S Supreme Court and the highest courts of New York and Texas on hiatus, the Supreme Court of Delaware and nine of the 13 U.S. Courts of Appeals supplied the commercial decisions that Roundup has cut into little pieces for you to sample.

Bonus content:

Commercial Roundup – August 23, 2023

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We round up the most significant appellate decisions relevant to commercial litigation each week.

This late-summer edition of Commercial Roundup features a notable ruling on personal jurisdiction, a pair of False Claims Act decisions, a couple of opinions tossing class certification orders, a 2-1 split in a securities fraud case (the dissent has the better end of it), a rare victory for plaintiffs in an action for unlawful maintenance of a monopoly, a broadening of RICO to cover loss of wages as injury to “business”, an en banc extension of Title VII to discriminatory time off rules, approval of a way to defeat removal post-removal, and some patent and insurance matters. Enjoy!

Commercial Roundup – September 15, 2023

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We round up the most significant appellate decisions relevant to commercial litigation each week.

Here you go–Commercial Roundup for the couple of weeks ending September 14, 2023

Commercial Roundup – October 25, 2023

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We round up the most significant appellate decisions relevant to commercial litigation each week.

Welcome back to Commercial Roundup. This installment will catch you up for the last several weeks.

Commercial Roundup – November 15, 2023

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We round up the most significant appellate decisions relevant to commercial litigation each week.

Welcome to the November 15, 2023 edition of Commercial Roundup. It will catch you up on the latest appellate decisions by federal appellate courts and the highest courts in Delaware, New York, and Texas on antitrust, arbitration, class actions, intellectual property, securities, and other important issues in complex business and commercial disputes.

Commercial Roundup – February 21, 2024

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We round up the most significant appellate decisions relevant to commercial litigation each week.

Welcome to The Contingency‘s Commercial Roundup for February 21. We have a ton of cases to catch up on, so let’s get right to it.


Commercial Roundup – April 16, 2024

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We round up the most significant appellate decisions relevant to commercial litigation each week.

Commercial Roundup has some catching up to do this week. See the jumbo installment below.

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